Detecting Bots Using a Hybrid Approach by Genfi, Edmund Kofi
Montclair State University 
Montclair State University Digital 
Commons 
Theses, Dissertations and Culminating Projects 
5-2021 
Detecting Bots Using a Hybrid Approach 
Edmund Kofi Genfi 
Montclair State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/etd 
 Part of the Computer Sciences Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Genfi, Edmund Kofi, "Detecting Bots Using a Hybrid Approach" (2021). Theses, Dissertations and 
Culminating Projects. 736. 
https://digitalcommons.montclair.edu/etd/736 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Montclair State University Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations and Culminating Projects by an authorized administrator of 






Artificial intelligence (AI) remains a crucial aspect for improving our modern lives but it 
also casts several social and ethical issues.  One issue is of major concern, investigated in 
this research, is the amount of content users consume that is being generated by a form of 
AI known as bots (automated software programs). With the rise of social bots and the 
spread of fake news more research is required to understand how much content generated 
by bots is being consumed.  This research investigates the amount of bot generated content 
relating to COVID-19.  While research continues to uncover the extent to which our social 
media platforms are being used as a terrain to spread information and misinformation, there 
still remain issues when it comes to distinguishing between social bots and humans that 
spread misinformation. Since online platforms have become a center for spreading fake 
information that is often accelerated using bots this research examines the amount of bot 
generated COVID-19 content on Twitter.  A hybrid approach is presented to detect bots 
using a Covid-19 dataset of 71,908 tweets collected between January 22nd, 2020 and April 
2020, when the total reported cases of Covid-19 were below 600 globally.   Three 
experiments were conducted using user account features, topic analysis, and sentiment 
features to detect bots and misinformation relating to the  Covid-19 pandemic. Using Weka 
Machine Learning Tool, Experiment I investigates the optimal algorithms that can be used 
to detect bots on Twitter. We used 10-fold cross validation to test for prediction accuracy 
on two labelled datasets. Each dataset contains a different set (category 1 and category 2) 
of four features. Results from Experiment I show that category 1 features (favorite count, 
listed count, name length, and number of tweets) combined with random forest algorithm 
 
 
produced the best prediction accuracy and performed better than features found in category 
2 (follower count, following count, length of screen name and description length). The best 
feature was listed count followed by favorite count. It was also observed that using category 
2 features for the two labelled datasets produced the same prediction accuracy (100%) 
when Tree based classifiers are used.  
To further investigate the validity of the features used in the two labelled datasets, in 
Experiment II, each labelled dataset from Experiment I was used as a training sample to 
classify two different labelled datasets. Results show that Category 1 features generated a 
94% prediction accuracy as compared to 60% accuracy generated by category 2 features 
using the Random Forest algorithm. Experiment III applies the results from Experiment I 
and II to classify 39,091 account that posted Coronavirus related content. Using the random 
forest algorithm and features identified Experiment I and II, our classification framework 
detected 5867 out of 39,091 (15%) account as bots and 33,224 (85%) accounts as humans. 
 Further analysis revealed that bot accounts generated 30% (1949/6446) of Coronavirus 
misinformation compared to 70% of misinformation created by human accounts.  Closer 
examination showed that about 30% of misinformation created by humans were retweets 
of bot content.  In addition, results suggest that bot accounts were involved in posting 
content on fewer topics compared to humans. Our results also show that bots generated 
more negative sentiments as compared to humans on Covid-19 related issues. 
Consequently, topic distribution and sentiment may further improve the ability to 
distinguish between bot and human accounts. 
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Approach, Social Networking Features, Sentiments Features 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation  
 
There has always been the need to study how Bots or network of Bots (Sybils) affects social 
media and its impact on politics and national security. If you are an individual that searches 
for daily news on social media, like most people do, then you may be exposed to many 
types of fake and misleading content (Dunn et al., 2011). For example, hoaxes, rumors, 
fabricated stories, conspiracy theories, and click-bait are all forms of misleading content 
(Dunn et al., 2011). While malicious social bots often wage disinformation campaigns by 
targeting political or economic content, the volume of such campaigns render manual 
detection infeasible. Social media users are often unable to identify content created by 
social bots.   Scrolling through your favorite social media page, it may not be obvious if 
you come across a bot account. 
A malicious bot is a compromised computer under the direction of a human operator called 
“Botmaster” (Feily et al., 2009). The term “Bot” is derived from the word “Robot”, and 
just like Robots, bots are created to perform a specific function in an automated manner 
(Feily et al., 2009). These bots are pieces of software programs that run on infected 
machines without the user knowing about their existence (Al-Hammadi & Aickelin, 2017). 
Botnets or Sybils (network of compromised computers) have become a huge cybersecurity 
problem  and have been used as a means to carry out most forms of cyber-attack (Eslahi et 




The presence of these computerized agents has been observed in many sections of social 
media applications such as Twitter which has been the most affected (Shao et al., 2018). 
These social media bots create a  platform for the spreading of several illegal activities 
such as launching DDOS attacks against specific targets (Feily et al., 2009). A publication 
on MIT Technology Review in 2020 reported that researchers observed that about half of 
some 200 million tweets on the novel COVID-19 likely came from bots, with many of 
them spreading false information, pushing conspiracy theories, and advocating for the 
United States to loosen restrictions in order to reopen America (Nearly Half of Twitter 
Accounts Pushing to Reopen America May Be Bots | MIT Technology Review, 2020). 
Figure 1.1 shows a typical Botnet architecture. 
 
Figure 1.1:  Botnet Architecture (Adapted from Depositphotos) 
  
Though hard to verify, researchers have also put forward claims about how fake news can 
change how people think during a pandemic (Evanega et al., 2020; Chen et al., 2020). Yet 




misinformation on social media relating to COVID-19 (P. Wang et al., 2018). The 
influence of fake news on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential elections is a crucial 
example that shows why much attention and research is needed to deal with malicious 
social media bots. Using a casual model , the authors  used  a dataset of about 171 million 
tweets to identify 30 million tweets spreading either false information or extremely biased 
news from about 2.2 million users (Bovet & Makse, 2019).  
Another research study used a dataset with 3.6 million tweets and observed that about 
23.6% of those tweets that were examined were spreading hate speech by dividing public 
views on issues concerning Brexit or the Catalan referendum (Rosso, 2019).  While 
misleading content is not something new, many online information platforms do not have 
adequate safeguards to control and the spread of misinformation. It is now easy to use 
social media to influence public opinion due to the low cost of creating fake websites and 
the existence of several software-controlled social media profiles or pages (Dunn et al., 
2011).  
Internet users believe in social contracts (Dunn et al., 2011) and can be made to accept and 
spread content produced in a certain way (P. Wang et al., 2018). Moreover, the 
augmentation of misleading news through social bots overwhelms our fact-checking 
capacity because of our definite attention, as well as our propensities to consider what 
appears current and to believe information in a social environment. A well worked out 
strategy is required to fight against the spread of misinformation online (Dunn et al., 2011). 
People need education when it comes to the consumption of news on all internet platforms 




are the reason for the spread of misinformation, then there is the need to focus our attention 
on coming up with techniques to detect these malicious bots. 
Mary Papenfuss from the HuffPost reported that there has been ongoing research about 
how social media bots are spreading misleading content about the novel Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) pandemic in May 2020. Researchers are yet to come up with a conclusion 
about the entities or organizations that may be primarily responsible for the bots.  The 
primary objectives of this study are therefore to find out if the spread of misinformation 
during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic era was done by activities of Bots using a 
hybrid Bot Detection model. 
False news, extensively disseminated over all internet platforms, can be considered as a 
form of computational propaganda (Howard et al., 2017). Social media have provided a 
platform for substantial volumes of fake, dramatic and other forms of junk news at delicate 
moments in our social setting, though most platforms disclose little about how much of this 
content there is or how it impacts those who use the platform (Howard et al., 2017).   
The United States Department of Homeland Security reported in 2020 that the World 
Economic Forum has identified the spread of disinformation as one of the top 10 threats to 
society(COVID-19 Exploited by Malicious Cyber Actors | CISA, 2020).  It has been 
reported that bots can jeopardize online information platforms as well as our society 
(Ferrara et al., 2016). Prior studies have done a sensational job trying to figure out the best 
malicious Bot detection technique to help slow down the spread of fake news on all online 
information platforms, however the bot strategies continue to evolve to evade detection. 
Today, some social bots have been used to penetrate political discourse, control the stock 




States elections, social media sites especially Twitter was flooded with bots that could 
evade most bot detection techniques. In a new study, researchers at University of Southern 
California identified thousands of bot accounts on Twitter that were uploading information 
related to Donald Trump, President Biden and their political campaigns.  Many of these 
automated accounts were spreading disinformation and far-right conspiracy theories such 
as “pizzagate” and  QAnon (Twitter Bots Poised to Spread Disinformation Before Election 
- The New York Times, 2020). Although social media platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook have worked effortlessly to control the impact of malicious social bots on their 
respective platforms, identifying these bots still remain a difficult task and warrant further 
research. The detection of social bots and the motive behind the spread of certain sensitive 
and malicious information continues to be a significant research endeavor (Ferrara et al., 
2016). 
1.2 Organization of the study  
 
This paper is organized into five (5) chapters. Chapter 1 which is the introductory chapter 
includes the background and motivation of the study, organization of the study, literature 
review and limitation of the study. The review of literature is an attempt to study prior 
studies on social bots to help have a better understanding of the issue or the problem this 
research seeks to solve. Chapter two includes the objectives of the study, problem statement 
and hypothesis.  Chapter 3 describes the methodology, the dataset used in this study as well 
as the description of the experiments conducted. Chapter 4 focuses on analysis of the data, 
experimental results, misinformation and topic analysis, entities responsible for the spread 
of Covid-19 misinformation and sentiment analysis.   Chapter five is the summary of the 




1.3 Literature Review 
 
Today, the research computing community is still designing sophisticated methods that can 
automatically detect or prevent malicious social bots that spread misinformation on online 
platforms. Bot detection techniques can be broadly divided into three distinct groups: (1) 
Graph-Based Social Bot Detection, (2) Crowdsourcing Social Bot Detection and (3) 
Feature-Based Social Bot Detection (Ferrara et al., 2016). 
 
1.3.1 Graph Based Social Bot Detection  
 
Graph Based Social Bot Detection is an intuitive way of representing network 
communications using graphs.  A strategy developed known as BotChase presents a two-
phased graph-based bot detection system that controls both unsupervised and supervised 
Machine Leaning. The authors application of BotChase could detect several types of bots 
and showed toughness to zero-day attacks (Daya et al., 2020). The author also observed 
that the BotChase strategy that they implemented was suitable for large-scale data and 
different network topologies. The authors in (Chowdhury et al., 2017) also proposed a bot 
detection technique based on topological characteristics of nodes within a graph. The 
authors administered a self-organizing map clustering method that was applied to establish 
clusters of nodes in the network based on these characteristics.  
Previous research has also proposed a method that can isolate nodes in clusters of small 
size while containing the majority of the normal node in the same big cluster (Daya et al., 




technique which makes use of a sequence of DNS queries in order to achieve robustness 
against evasion techniques (Lee & Lee, 2014).  
While Graph-Based detection can be applied without knowledge of a specific language a 
major challenge is the availability of information that captures the complete topology of 
the network. The best bot detection technique that applies Graph- Based Social Bot 
Detection uses a hybrid analysis of flow-based and Graph- based traffic behaviors (W. 
Wang et al., 2020). The authors argued that only using graph-based analysis would result 
in false negatives or false positives or can even be eluded by malicious bots (W. Wang et 
al., 2020).  To address the limitation with graph-based analysis they proposed another 
model known as BotMark that uses a hybrid analysis of flow –based and graph-based 
network traffic behaviors (W. Wang et al., 2020).  The authors technique was able to 
characterize the botnets actions thoroughly as compared to other techniques. (W. Wang et 
al., 2020) report that one limitation with BotMark is that Botnets can use a legitimate server 
as their C&C communication to avoid detection.  Since this paper will not be investigating 
network communication patterns between nodes, this study will not adopt this technique to 
detect malicious Twitter accounts.   
1.3.2 Crowdsourcing Social Bot Detection 
 
Wang et.al (2020) looked at the possibility of bot detection by humans. The authors 
recommended crowdsourcing of social bot detection to multitudes of workers. An online 
Social Turing test platform was created to see if humans can easily detect bot through the 
evaluation of conversational nuances like sarcasm or perspective language or to look at 




obtained from Facebook and Renren which is an online Chinese social networking 
platform. The authors observed that the detection accuracy of both “experts” and “turkers” 
under various conditions vary tremendously in their effectiveness with experts consistently 
producing near perfect results. Though a great technique, crowdsourcing bot detection 
method has its drawbacks and might not be cost effective to help achieve the listed 
objectives and answer the research questions that this paper seeks to address.   
1.3.3 Feature-based Social Bot Detection  
 
Feature-based Social Bot Detection focuses on behavioral patterns that can be easily 
encoded in features and adopted with machine learning strategies to observe the patterns 
of human-like and bot-like behaviors (Ferrara et al., 2016.).  Feature-based Social Bots 
Detection makes it easier to categorize accounts based on their detected behaviors (Ferrara 
et al., 2016).  
The first social bot detection interface for Twitter in 2014 was made public to educate 
individuals on online information platforms about the presence of malicious bot activities 
(Ferrara et al., 2016). The authors proposed a bot detection algorithm that uses predictive 
features that detect a variety of malicious behaviors to deduce if information was created 
by a bot or human. A collection of networks, linguistic and application-oriented variables 
are used as likely features that associate certain characteristics to humans or bots (Ferrara 
et al., 2016). The challenge with using Feature-based bot detection is finding ground truth 
dataset that can be used as a training set to classify an unlabeled dataset. Another challenge 
is that the characteristics of a bot is increasingly becoming more humanlike so relying on 








The main objective of this present study is to contribute to an understanding of how 
social media bots spread misleading information on online information platforms and 
to find out if the spread of misinformation during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) 
pandemic era was done by activities of Bots or other individuals/organizations using 
hybrid approach that incorporates sentiment features, national language processing and 
social networking features to detect bots. The two main objectives for this research are 
to:   
1. Identify twitter features that provide high discrimination quality for detecting bots 
2. Investigate the spread of misinformation by bots during the initial months of the 
COVID-19 pandemic 
Prior research indicates that the user metadata and user content provide the greatest 
discrimination accuracy (Shin et al., 2012).  However, details on the specific features 
within each category are not reported.  To optimize the performance of the classifier, 
optimal features within each category will be identified.  Also, there is a discrepancy in 
prior research regarding the quality of network features.  While user meta-data and user 
content have shown to perform the best (Shin et al., 2012), other studies suggest network 
features provided the highest accuracy for detecting content polluters (Dhital & Gonen, 
2019).  We aim to use a hybrid approach that incorporates user account features and 




3. To identify the source (bot or human account) responsible for spreading 
misinformation during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic era.  
2.2 Problem Statement  
 
Many studies have been conducted on social media bots to examine how to detect them 
and how these bots spread misinformation in online information platforms. Prior research 
reviewed techniques that can be used to fabricate misinformation by combining social bots 
and fake news to spread misinformation in a social setting (Daya et al.,2019; Wang et. al 
in 2018). (Eslahi et.al in 2012), studied the characteristics of the malicious activities of 
Bots and Botnets and came up with various detection techniques as well the challenges that 
accompanied those techniques. (Shao et al., 2018) studied how social bots spreads fake 
news by analyzing 14 million messages that were spreading 400 thousand claims during 
the 2016 US presidential elections.  The study concluded that social bots played a key role 
in the spread of fake news during that time. Another study used a dataset with 3.6 million 
tweets with a casual model  and observed that about 23.6% of those tweets that were 
examined were spreading hate speech by dividing public views on issues concerning Brexit 
or the Catalan referendum (Rosso, 2019).  
(Ferrara et al., 2016) studied the rise of social bots and its impact on several online 
information platforms. Every aspect of our society is impacted heavily by social media 
today as it allows users to interconnect and exchange content freely (P. Wang et al., 2018). 
(Shin et al., 2012) among others also used a technique known as EFFORT to efficiently 
and effectively detect Bot Malware.  (Shin et al., 2012) report that EFFORT can detect all 




Recently, as of August 2020, there has been ongoing research about how social media bots 
are spreading misleading content about the novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. The 
authors in (Varol et al., 2017; Rosso, 2019; Shao et al., 2018; Daya et al., 2019; Kudugunta 
& Ferrara, 2018) among others have studied the impact of malicious social bots and ways 
malicious social bots can be detected or prevented. However, researchers are yet to come 
up with a conclusion about what interest/entity may be primarily responsible for the bots. 
Although several techniques to detect malicious social bots have been created, there still 
remain issues when it comes distinguishing between social bots and human bots that spread 
misinformation. Since manual bot detection is infeasible, this study will develop a novel 
automated method to identify bots.  While many automated methods have been proposed 
they have mainly been driven by features available in Twitter and apply single method 
approaches based on application specific features (Wang et al., 2019; Shin et al., 2012; 
Dhital & Gonen, 2019). To accomplish this task a hybrid approach that combines a variety 
of factors to detect bots will be developed.  Specifically, the proposed bot detection model 
will incorporate user account features, topic analysis and sentiment analysis. It is also our 
objective to test different user account features to see which feature or set of features 
produces the best classification accuracy. (Varol et al., 2017) for example achieved the best 
classification performance by using two user account features i.e., follower count and 
friend count while (Wijeratne et al., 2017) observed that favorite count, tweet count and 
friend count are  top three features that produced the best classification accuracy in their 
research. We aim to use, test and rank all Twitter user account features available in our 
Covid-19 Twitter dataset to observe their prediction and classification accuracy. The 




This research will develop a model to identify bots and provide insights for organizations 
or entities who have interest in controlling these bots that have spread of misinformation 
during the Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic era.  
2.3 Hybrid Approach  
 
This research proposes a hybrid method that integrates Twitter user account features, 
sentiments features and topic analysis, to detect malicious social bots. A hybrid approach 
is a way of combining multiple approaches to improve detection accuracy (Ferrara et al., 
2016). Wang et. al in 2018 developed a practical system using a server-side clickstream 
technique that showed effectiveness and high detection accuracy in detecting fake 
identities.  This present study will rely on a similar approach conducted in prior research 
to detect bots by analyzing topical content (Morstatter et al., 2016).  In a prior study it was 
observed that the content posted by bots can be a solid indicator that can help detect them 
(Morstatter et al., 2016).  The authors used Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) to attain 
topic representation of each user.  However, the issue with using content for bot detection 
is that the nature of the text features is sparse and have high dimensionality (Morstatter et 
al., 2016).   
Based on the review of prior bot detection studies, while many bot detection methods have 
been proposed, the feature-based detection appears to be most promising method and is 
therefore the focus of this research.  This research will investigate new features and features 
that have been underexplored in previous studies. Many studies have examined bot 
detection accuracy using specific Twitter user account features  (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 




prediction and classification accuracy compared to  features from a previous study (Lee, 
Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011). In this paper, we investigate the following three features: (1) 
topic distribution, (2) listed count, and (3) favorite count. These three user account features 
have been rarely used in prior research. Topic distribution on Twitter has to do with the 
variety of sentiments expressed by users on any given issue. listed count is a curated group 






Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
This is an empirical based research that uses several datasets with three experiments to 
detect bots and bot generated content. We start by generating a Twitter dataset associated 
with the novel coronavirus COVID-19 in a three-month period between January 22, 2020 
to April 23, 2020. The Twitter’s search API is used to hydrate tweets from multiple 
countries in various languages that contained any word associated with COVID-19 (i.e., 
ncov19, corona, covid, covid-19, virus, coronavirus, ncov2019) that were used in (Lopez 
et al., 2020). In order to stick to Twitter’s [Terms of service] 
(https://developer.twitter.com/en/developer-terms/agreement-and-policy), only the Tweet 
IDs of the Tweets collected are made available for non-commercial research use only. 
The only keyword used hydrate tweets for the month of January was “Coronavirus” as 
there was less talk of the pandemic at that time. As news about the Coronavirus spread, 
additional keywords were added to the search list.  
Month   Keyword(s)  
January   Coronavirus, virus  
February   Coronavirus, virus ncov19, 
ncov2019  
March   coronavirus, virus, covid, 
ncov19, ncov2019  
April   coronavirus, virus, covid, 
ncov19, ncov2019  
Table 3.1: Shows the various months and the keyword used to hydrate the tweets. 
 
The keywords, presented in Table 3.1, used for search tweets are: virus and coronavirus 
since 22 January, ncov19 and ncov2019 since 26 February, Coronavirus, virus, ncov19, 
ncov2019 since 7 March 2020 and all keywords were used to hydrate tweets for the month 




month period that this paper focused on. Since there was a disproportionate amount of data 
collected in January compared to other months this data was excluded from the analysis.  
Moreover, twitter API can provide tweets up to 7 days so we ensured that there was a lag 
of 7 days in the dataset to make sure enough tweets were hydrated. It is worth noting that 
our dataset does not capture every tweet on twitter related to the Covid-19 keywords used 
for hydration due to Twitter’s limits on how much tweets can be hydrated every 15 minutes.  
However, it is also worth noting that there were some inconsistencies in our data collection 
process. For example, only tweets in English were hydrated from 22 January to 31 January, 
2020, after this brief period we found an algorithm that could collect tweets in all 
languages. Our data collection technique could also track other keywords unrelated to 
Covid-19 which resulted in fewer tweets relating to Coronavirus in our dataset in the first 
few weeks. 
3.1 Datasets  
 
Obtaining a social bot dataset can be cumbersome due to the challenge in obtaining 
conclusive ground truth (Morstatter et al., 2016). Two labeled datasets are used for ground 
truth and serve as the training datasets: social honeypot and RTbust.  The trained datasets 
are used to detect bots with three test datasets (1) Fame for sale, (2) BotWikiCelebrity, and 
(3) COVID-19.  The classes for the Fame for sale and BotWikiCelebrity datasets are known 
and the trained datasets are used to evaluate classification accuracy against data where the 
classes are known.  The COVID-19 data is unlabeled.  While several ways to detect bots 
have been put forward, we use two approaches to label Twitter users as bots or humans: 




selected five (5) datasets of verified human and bot account from Bot Repository 
(https://botometer.osome.iu.edu/bot-repository/datasets.html). We use Weka machine 
learning tool to test for prediction accuracy to help select the best labelled dataset that can 
be used as a training set for classification in this paper. The nature of the datasets and how 
we collected the five (5) datasets have been summarized below: 
3.1.1Training Dataset 
 
3.1.1.1 The Social Honeypot Dataset 
 
We use the Social Honeypot dataset as a training set in this paper. We chose the social 
honeypot dataset because of its high prediction accuracy i.e., 99%. (Lee, Eoff, and 
Caverlee, 2011) created a honeypot that could attract content polluters in Twitter. (Lee, 
Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) generated and deployed 60 social honeypot accounts in Twitter 
whose function was to act like Twitter users and report what accounts follow or otherwise 
communicate with them. (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) manipulated how frequent the 
honeypot account post and the sort of content that these accounts post on Twitter. The 
author’s manipulation system ran from December 30, 2009 to August 2, 2010 and a total 
of 22,223 polluters and 19,276 legit users were detected from 5,643,297 tweets. (Lee, Eoff, 
and Caverlee, 2011) created a wide variety of user account features that were a part of one 
of four groups:  
• UD screen name length, description length, account age 
• UFN following count, follower count, the ratio of the number of following and the 
number of followers, bidirectional friend’s percentage 




• UH following change rate   
(Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) tested 30 classification algorithms using Weka machine 
learning toolkit on five  user account features ( i.e., screen name length, description length, 
followers count, following count, and statuses count) and found their results consistent with 
accuracy ranging between 98% to  95%. (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) used these five 
categories of features as these features produced the highest accuracy results in their 
experiment. Table 3.2 shows a breakdown of content polluters and legit users that was 
detected by the manipulation model built by (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011).  
Class User Profiles Tweets 
Polluters 22,223 2,380,059 
Legit Users 19,276 3,263,238 
Table 3.2: Social Honeypot Dataset. 
 
3.1.1.2 RTbust Dataset 
 
We use the RTbust dataset as our second training set in this paper. With a prediction 
accuracy of 100%, (Mazza et al., 2019) had access to all Twitter metadata fields for each 
tweet, retweet and user in their dataset. To collect this dataset, the authors used Twitter 
Premium Search API to build a complete dataset using the following query parameters: 
lang: IT and is: retweet. The authors carried out a manual annotation of a small subset of 
the dataset to see the extent to which their technique was capable of correctly spotting bots 
and ended up with an almost balanced annotated dataset, comprising of 51% bots and 49% 
human accounts. The authors dataset consists of Italian tweets shared in a 2-week period 




retweets, shared by 1,446,250 different users. (Mazza et al., 2019) observed that on an 
average each user in their dataset retweeted about 7 times per day which was in line with 
current statistics that reported daily retweets between 2 to 50 for legitimate users. (Mazza 
et al., 2019) argue that although their dataset is mainly Italian, the analytical approach and 
the data collection process is strictly language independent. We use all 14,640,084 tweets 
from 1000 annotated accounts from the RTbust dataset in this paper.  
3.2 Test Datasets   
 
3.2.1 Fame for sale Dataset  
 
The fame for sale: Efficient Detection of fake Twitter followers on twitter was used as a 
testing dataset in this paper.  (Cresci et al., 2015) set up a project to recruit Twitter users to 
voluntarily join an academic study for discovering fake followers on Twitter. This initiative 
was set up by (Cresci et al., 2015)  to create a dataset of verified human accounts on Twitter. 
(Cresci et al., 2015) launched a verification phase on the 574 human accounts and named 
this initiative as the “the fake project” dataset. The #elezioni2013 (E13) was also created 
by (Cresci et al., 2015) and it is made up of active Italian Twitter  users, with different 
professional profiles and belong to assorted social classes.  
To create their bot dataset, (Cresci et al., 2015) purchased 3000 fake accounts in April, 
2013 from different Twitter online markets. To be specific, the authors purchased 1000 
fake accounts from http://fastfollowerz.com, 1000 from https://intertwitter.com and 1000 
fake accounts from http://twittertechnology.com. To create our legitimate user dataset, we 
sampled 235 out of 574 human accounts from “thefakeproject” (TFP) and 964 out of 1488 




selecting all 1335 fake followers from the “intertwitter” (INT) dataset.   Therefore, a total 
of 1199 legitimate accounts and 1335 fake accounts were used for the test dataset. The 
account details for the test dataset as well as the number of followers and friends are 
provided in Table 3.3 
Dataset  Accounts  Followers  Friends  
TFP (@TheFakeProject  235 183,166 152,664 
E13 (#elezioni2013) 964 797,432 420,450 









Testing Dataset  2534 1,003,116 1,090,214 
 
Table 3.3: Shows statistics about total collected data for testing. 
 
 3.2.2 BotwikiCelebrity Dataset  
 
The performance of the social honeypot dataset was not encouraging so we created the 
BotwikiCelebrity dataset as another test dataset to see if the classification framework from 
the social honeypot dataset can accurately distinguish between what is a human and what 
is a bot. We performed a cross-dataset analysis by using uploaded bot dataset on Bot 
Repository to create our final testing dataset. To create our final testing dataset, we merged 
the Self-identified bots (botwiki-verified) dataset from (Yang et al., 2020)  and Celebrity 
account collected as authentic users (celebrity) dataset from (Onur et al., 2019) to create a 
new testing dataset.  One way to analyze different labeled  dataset is to look at the datasets 
in feature space (Yang et al., 2020). Visualizing the two datasets together was difficult as 




the botwiki dataset and 500 out of 20,984 verified human accounts from the celebrity 
dataset to create a balanced dataset.   
3.2.3 COVID-19 Dataset   
 
Using Twitter’s API, we hydrated tweets relating to Covid-19 from January to April to 
build the Covid-19 dataset. To quantify text and make sure certain characters are not 
counted, we removed characters such as (;, :, *. ‘’, ,|,\, {,[, spaces etc.) from the text 
attribute. Using the user_attribute_string function we extracted the user attributes such as 
user_id, description, friend count, follower count etc.  from the user column to create a 
total of 71,908 tweets out of 115,000 tweets that we collected from January to April.  
Dataset Number of bots Number of humans Data points Account 
Features 
Social Honeypot  22,223 19,276 41,499 5 
RTbust  190 209 399 8 
Botwiki  698 0 698 8 
Celebrity  0 5971 5971 8 
Covid-19  Unlabeled Unlabeled 71,908 8 
Table 3.4: Shows the datasets used for our experiment. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses  
To achieve the stated objectives in section 2.1, the following four hypotheses are 
investigated: 
H1:  The spread of misinformation or disinformation by bots regarding content related to 
COVID-19 will be higher than the spread of misinformation or disinformation by humans. 




we do not attempt to distinguish between misinformation and disinformation.  It is 
therefore our objective to analyze the percentage of social media bots in our examined 
Covid-19.  
H2:  The accuracy to detect misinformation by bots will be higher using twitter features 
such as favorite count, listed count, and topic distribution as compared to social honeypot 
features. In this paper, we propose three new features: (1) topic distribution, (2) listed count 
and (3) favorite count. 
These three user account features have been rarely used in prior research. Topic distribution 
on Twitter has to do with the variety of sentiments expressed by users on any given issue. 
Listed count is a curated group of Twitter accounts, and favorite count is the number of 
accounts a Twitter user has favorited. 
Most prior studies have relied on well-known Twitter user account features such as count, 
friend count, Tweet count, name length, account age and description length.  These features 
are considered to be top features with the highest predictive power and few research studies 
have investigated features such as listed count, favorite count, and screen name length as 
they have a lower predictive power when it comes to distinguishing between a bot and a 
human (Varol et al., 2017; A. H. Wang, 2010; Cresci et al., 2015; Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 
2011).  Favorite count, listed count and screen name length will be used in our training and 
testing experiment to see how well they improve our classification algorithm.     
H3:  The distribution of different topics will be greater for humans compared to bots. We 




Our reasoning is that we think bots are much more likely to have a target or an agenda that 
needs to be talked about to change the economic, political or social setting of an online 
platform. Hashtags will be extracted from tweets text for all tweets hydrated between 1st 
February, 2020 to 31st April 2020. Bot sentinel will be used to estimate hashtags with 
emerging popularity to help us test our hypothesis 3.   
H4:  Detected bots will express more negative sentiments compared to humans.  
The rationale behind this is that we believe bots are more likely to engage in creating 





We first aim to replicate the results found in (Cresci et al., 2015) and the merged 
BotwikiCelebrity dataset by using the classification framework we build using the Social 
Honeypot Dataset and the RTbust Dataset. Comparing the results obtained through the 
experiment and the ones reported in (Cresci et al., 2015), (Yang et al., 2020) and  (Onur et 
al., 2019) will increase the level of confidence in the hybrid approach that this research will 
rely on.  To achieve this objective, this paper will test ten features (see Table 3.5) as seen 










Table 3.5: Shows the features that will be used in this study. Features that are not seen in the Social Honeypot 
dataset are shaded in grey.   New feature proposed shaded in light blue.  Features that are seen in all the 
datasets used in this study are are not shaded.  Datasets: (1) = Fame for sale, (2) = Social Honeypot, (3) = Self-
identified bots, (4) = RTbust 
 
These ten features are highly predictive and capture several suspicious behaviors which 
make it easier to differentiate between a bot and a human account using a bot detection 
algorithm (Ferrara et al., 2016).  If the results demonstrate potential, this study will 
implement a new method to detect social bots by using a hybrid approach that incorporates 
sentiment features  
Twitter Attributes Description (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Name  Twitter defines “name” as the name of the user x  x x 
Listed count   Curated group of Twitter accounts x  x x 
Favorite count   The number of accounts a user has favorited x  x x 
Statuses count  The number Tweets (including retweet) issued by a 
specific user 
x  x x 
Sentiment  Sentiments expressed on a given subject x x x x 
User id  User features based on Twitter meta-data x x x x 
Screen name   Handle or alias that a specific user identifies with x x x x 
Follower count  The total number of Twitter users that follow a 
specific user 
x x x x 
Friends count  Total number of Twitter users that follow a specific 
user 
x x x x 




and user account features.  The new approach that this study seeks to implement will then 
be tested on the COVID-19 dataset of millions of tweets between February, 2020 and April, 
2020. We explain how we conducted our experiments in subsections 3.4.1 – 3.4.4. 
3.4.1 Experiment I 
 
We use the Social Honeypot Dataset and the RTbust dataset as our baseline dataset in our 
first experiment. Using Weka machine learning tool (Witten et al., 2005),  we followed the 
same classification framework used by the authors in (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) and 
(Mazza et al., 2019) to see what the dataset’s prediction accuracy is. We tested 20 
classification algorithms, such as random forest, naive Bayes, logistic regression and tree-
based algorithm, all with default values for all parameters using 10-fold cross validation. 
10-fold cross validation is a way of dividing the original data into 10 equally-sized sub-
samples, and executing 10 training and validation procedures (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 
2011).  
3.4.2 Experiment II 
 
In experiment II, we take the best training dataset from Experiment I to classify the Fame 
for sale dataset. The social honeypot dataset or the RTbust dataset would be supplied as a 
training set for the Fame for sale dataset. We test for accuracy by replacing the class labels 
in the Fame for sale dataset with questions marks (?). Using Weka machine learning tool 
(Witten et al., 2005), we try to replicate the results found in the Fame for sale dataset by 
using our training datasets from experiment I.  If the prediction results are not encouraging, 




3.4.3 Experiment III 
 
Results from Experiment II will show which training dataset will be used for our unlabeled 
Covid-19 dataset in Experiment III. We aim to classify the unlabeled Covid-19 dataset with 
the best classification framework from Experiment II. An independent data analysis would 
be done by randomly comparing 7000 detected tweets from bots and 14,000 detected 
tweets from humans out of a total of 39,091 tweets to understand the sort of misinformation 
or information that were being amplified between February and April. We intend to achieve 
this by using an online sentiment tool known as Bot Sentinel. A fact checking tool known 
as Poynter would also be used to check for misinformation in Experiment III.   
3.4.4 Experimental Steps 
  
Initially, the plan for this research was to study and collect data on Twitter users that were 
actively posting Covid-19 tweets overtime but that was time consuming and very expensive 
to achieve. We therefore rely on a dataset that we collected from January to April to test 
the new approach that we propose for this paper. However, based on pilot studies we 
conducted it was determined that tweet length and sentiment expressed over time was the 
most accurate method for distinguishing a bot from a human.  As a result, we relied on 
daily tweet length plus all other user account features to improve the accuracy of our 
results.  
Additionally, there are other user account features such as location, verified, protected, 
default profile image among others were discarded as there was little to no information to 
collect for these features. To deliver accurate results, this study will try to duplicate the 




behavioral patterns established in  (Mazza et al., 2019) and (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011)  
to see if the experiment can come up with the same results seen in (Cresci et al., 2015) and 






Figure 3.1: A graphic displaying our research plan. 
 
Comparing the results obtained through the experiment and the ones reported in (Cresci et 
al., 2015); (Onur et al., 2019) and (Yang et al., 2020) will increase the level of confidence 
in the hybrid approach that this research will rely on. Figure 3.2 is a graphic display of the 
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Chapter 4 Experimental Results  
 
For the following experiments metadata associated with user accounts are used as the 
features to detect bots.  Tweets and tweet content is not used in the subsequent analyses. 
4.1 Experiment I 
 
For the Social Honeypot dataset, we found the results from Weka consistent, with a 
prediction accuracy ranging from 100% to 87% across most classifiers (15 out 20 tested). 
For the other 5 out of 20 tested, accuracy ranges between 84% to as low as 53%. Since the 
Social Honeypot dataset has fewer features as compared to the RTbust dataset, we first 
tested the same features seen in the social honeypot dataset for the RTbust dataset. 
Prediction accuracy for the RTbust dataset ranges between 100% to 63% across most 
classifiers (15 out 20 tested) and for the other 5 out of 20 tested, accuracy ranges between 
63% to as low as 52%. 
We observed that the strength of the classification lies primarily in the preference of 
features used. Tree-based classifiers generated the best accuracy results. We also observed 
an increase in prediction accuracy from 5% to 20% across most classifiers when all features 
are used for the RTbust dataset. While it is clear that Tree-based classifiers produced the 
best accuracy results, we observed that classification accuracy significantly drops after 
Random Forest classifier in Table 4.1. 
To understand why that is the case, we examined the nature of the social honeypot and the 





Table 4.1: shows the prediction accuracy of our two baseline datasets. 
noting that some classifiers work well with smaller dataset while others do well with large 
datasets. NaiveBayes, Logistic Regression, ZeroR etc. works well when the dataset is small 
Classifier  Social Honeypot  RTbust  




Random Tree 100% 100% 100% 
Kstar 100% 100% 100% 
IBk 100% 100% 100% 
Random Forest  99.9% 100% 100% 
REPTree 93.5% 82.2% 79.1% 
J48 93% 81% 85.2% 
LMT 92.5% 79% 81.7% 
Decision Table  92.5% 69.6% 79.9% 
JRip 92.7% 78.6% 82.9% 
PART  92.4% 72.6% 82.2% 
Multilayer Perception  91.7% 62.4% 81.9% 
BayesNet  89.6% 69.6% 79,6% 
SGD  89.4% 63.1% 75.9% 
SimpleLogistic  87.1% 63.6% 76.1% 
Logistic  87.1% 63.6% 75.6% 
SMO 84.9% 59.6% 72.4% 
OneR 81.1% 77.9% 81.4% 
NaiveBayes  72.7% 52.6% 56.2% 
NaiveBayesMultinominal 56.8% 58.1% 62.9% 
ZeroR 53.5% 52.3% 52.3% 




as these classifiers has enough room to construct the decision boundary (Text Classification 
with Extremely Small Datasets | by Anirudh Shenoy | Towards Data Science, 2019.).  
On the other hand, Tree-based classifiers and Random Forest work well with large datasets 
as they require little data preparation and can handle both numerical and categorical data 
(7 Types of Classification Algorithms - Analytics India Magazine, 2020).  (Kirubavathi 
Venkatesh & Anitha Nadarajan, 2012), (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011), (Ji et al., 2016), 
(Cresci et al., 2015), (Yang et al., 2020.), (Onur et al., 2019), (Davis et al., 2016) among 
others have shown that Random Forest classifier is the best classifier when it comes 
classifying a large Twitter  dataset. For the purpose of this research, Random Forest has 
been used to examine the results of this study.   
To see which additional user account feature improved the prediction power for the RTbust 
dataset, using Weka machine learning tool we compare the performance of the features that 
are not used in the social honeypot dataset to the features used in the social honeypot 
dataset. We grouped the user account into two categories with Category 1 being the features 
used in the social honeypot dataset and Category 2 representing the features that are not 
seen in the social honeypot dataset. We used Tree-based classifiers only to test and compare 
these categories of features. The categories and the results are shown below: 
Category 1: (nonsocial honeypot features): listed count, favorite count, length of name and 
number of tweets  
Category 2: (social honeypot features): follower count, following count, length of screen 










(not social honeypot) 
Random Tree 100% 100% 100% 
Random Forest  100% 100% 100% 
J48 85.2% 81% 80% 
LMT 81.7% 79% 81% 
REPTree 79.1% 82% 83% 
Average 89% 88% 89% 
Table 4.1.1: Prediction accuracy using all features, Category 1 and Category 2 . 
 
We observed that features found in Category 1 performed better than those found in 
Category 2. In general, there was a 1% to 2% prediction accuracy increase across most 
Tree-based classifiers that were used. Figure 4.1.1 also shows that the RTbust dataset 
performs better when all user account features are used. Figure 4.1.1 and Figure 4.1.2 
shows user account features from the RTbust and Social Honeypot dataset and their order 
of importance. The x-axis shows the user account features and their respective values. 
Figure 4.1.1 shows that listed count, favorite count, screen name length, name length and 
description length improve the prediction accuracy of the RTbust classification framework 
as compared to statuses count, following count and friend count. Figure 4.1.2 on the other 







Figure 4.1.1: Shows RTbust user account features and their performance values. 
 
To understand why performance values are not consistent across the features used in the 
RTbust dataset, we examined the nature of the RTbust dataset and noticed that there was 
not much difference statistically when we compare the following count, friend count and 
statuses count of bots to that of humans. There was however a major statistical difference 
when we compare bots to humans using listed count, favorite count, screen name length 
and name length. It is worth noting that Figure 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 shows the order of 
importance of features for both dataset and does not necessarily mean that features with 
low performance values are not good for making predictions. RTbust dataset for example 
shows that prediction accuracy is high when all features are used compared to when few 
are used.  


































However, the social honeypot dataset performed poorly when used as a training dataset for 
the fame for sale dataset because the dataset does not have 3 out of the top 4 performing 
features which are better for classifying unlabeled data and this explains why the RTbust 
dataset is the best for classifying the unlabeled Covid-19 dataset.  
 
 
Figure 4.1.2: Shows Social Honeypot user account features and their performance values. 
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4.2 Experiment II 
 
In Experiment II, we first used each of our baseline datasets as a training set for our testing 
dataset. The social honeypot dataset was supplied as a training set for the Fame for sale 
dataset.  The social honeypot dataset with a 99% prediction accuracy correctly classified 
all accounts that were verified as bots in the Fame for sale: efficient detection of fake 
Twitter follower’s dataset but misclassified 1284 human accounts as bots. The social 
honeypot dataset could detect only 196 out of a total of 1199 verified human accounts as 
humans. Table 4.3 shows that the social honeypot dataset performed poorly when used as 
a training set for the Fame for sale dataset.  
Using random forest classifier, the social honeypot dataset achieved a 47.6% precision and 
51% accuracy. With so many incorrect classifications, we think the reason is due to the 
fact that the social honeypot dataset is an old dataset which does not have other features 
like name length, listed count, favorite count, reply count etc.  that can be relied on to 
improve detection accuracy. Additional factors that contributed to the poor results from 
our first experiment will be discussed further below. The confusion matrix for the Social 









Results   True Positive   True Negative   
Predicted Positive   1335 (TP)  1003 (FP)  
Predicted Negative   0 (FN)  196 (TN)  
 
 
Table 4.2.1: Confusion matrix for the result from our Social Honeypot  testing dataset. The metrics used          
were:screen_nameLength, description_length, following_count, friend_count,and  statuses_count. 
 
 
Measure  Value  Derivations  
Sensitivity  1.0000  TPR = TP / (TP + FN)  
Specificity  0.1635  SPC = TN / (FP + TN)  
Precision  0.5710 PPV = TP / (TP + FP)  
Negative Predictive Value  1.000 NPV = TN / (TN + FN)  
False Positive Rate  0.8365 FPR = FP / (FP + TN)  
False Discovery Rate  0.4290  FDR = FP / (FP + TP)  
False Negative Rate  0.0000  FNR = FN / (FN + TP)  
Accuracy  0.6042 ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)  
F1 Score  0.7269 F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)  
Matthews Correlation 
Coefficient  






Results   True Positive   True Negative   
Predicted Positive   1308 (TP)  112 (FP)  
Predicted Negative   27 (FN)  1087 (TN)  
Measure  Value  Derivations  
Sensitivity  0.9798 TPR = TP / (TP + FN)  
Specificity  0.9066  SPC = TN / (FP + TN)  
Precision  0.9211 PPV = TP / (TP + FP)  
Negative Predictive Value  0.9758 NPV = TN / (TN + FN)  
False Positive Rate  0.0934 FPR = FP / (FP + TN)  
False Discovery Rate  0.0789  FDR = FP / (FP + TP)  
False Negative Rate  0.0202 FNR = FN / (FN + TP)  
Accuracy  0.9451 ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)  
F1 Score  0.9495 F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)  
Matthews Correlation 
Coefficient  
0.8916 TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP) 
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP)  
*(TN+FN))  
Table 4.2.2: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were: favorite count, 





With precision and accuracy at 72% and 80% respectively, the RTbust dataset performed 
better than the social honeypot dataset.  
Dataset Accuracy F1 
Social Honeypot 60% 0.73 
RTbust 94% 0.95 
 
Table 4.2.3: Comparison of accuracy and F1 for classifying Fame for Sale with the following features from 
social honeypot: tLengthofName, tLengthofScreenName, tNumberofListedCount, tNumberoffavoriteCount 
and tNumberofStatusesCount. 
 
In our next RTbust classification experiment, we used the features that generated the best 
predictive accuracy (i.e., listed count, favorite count, length of name, length of screen name 
and statuses count) to see if the classification results would improve. The confusion matrix 
for the classification framework is shown in Table 4.2.4. With precision and accuracy at 
92% and 95% respectively, we decided to add more features to see if the accuracy of the 
results improves. Since the strength of the classifier is dependent on the selective power of 
the metric used (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011), in our next classification test, we randomly 








Results True Positive True Negative 
Predicted Positive 968 (TP) 369 (FP) 
Predicted Negative 168 (FN) 1308 (TN) 
 
Table 4.2.2: Confusion matrix for the results of our RTbust testing dataset. Metrics used were: follower 
count, following count, length of screen name and description length 
 
Measure  Value  Derivations  
Sensitivity  0.8521 TPR = TP / (TP + FN)  
Specificity  0.7800 SPC = TN / (FP + TN)  
Precision  0.7240 PPV = TP / (TP + FP)  
Negative Predictive Value  0.8862 NPV = TN / (TN + FN)  
False Positive Rate  0.2200 FPR = FP / (FP + TN)  
False Discovery Rate  0.2760  FDR = FP / (FP + TP)  
False Negative Rate  0.1479 FNR = FN / (FN + TP)  
Accuracy  0.8091 ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)  
F1 Score  0.7829 F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)  
Matthews Correlation 
Coefficient  
0.6210 TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP) 




Results   True Positive   True Negative   
Predicted Positive   1275 (TP)  356 (FP)  
Predicted Negative   61 (FN)  841 (TN)  
 
 
Measure  Value  Derivations  
Sensitivity  0.9551  TPR = TP / (TP + FN)  
Specificity  0.7026  SPC = TN / (FP + TN)  
Precision  0.7817  PPV = TP / (TP + FP)  
Negative Predictive Value  0.9334  NPV = TN / (TN + FN)  
False Positive Rate  0.2183  FPR = FP / (FP + TN)  
False Discovery Rate  0.0449  FDR = FP / (FP + TP)  
False Negative Rate  0.0202  FNR = FN / (FN + TP)  
Accuracy  0.8357  ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)  
F1 Score  0.8597  F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)  
Matthews Correlation 
Coefficient  
0.6858  TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP) 
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP) *(TN+FN))  
 
Table 4.2.4: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were: 
tLengthofName, tLengthofScreenName, tNumberofListedCount, tLengthofdescription, 
tNumberoffavoriteCount and tNumberofStatusesCount. 
 
We observed that precision and accuracy dropped from 92% to 78.2% and 95% to 84% 
respectively when description_length was introduced as a new feature. We decided to 
randomly add more features to see how the results changes. To do this, we added follower 
count, and following count to the set of features that we have already tested to observe the 
changes in precision and recall. The confusion matrix for the classification framework is 




Results   True Positive   True Negative   
Predicted Positive   150 (TP)  134(FP)  
Predicted Negative   1185 (FN)  990(TN)  
 
Table 4.2 5: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were: 
tLengthofName, tLengthofScreenName, tNumberofListedCount, tNumberoffavorite, 
tTheNumberofFollowers, tTheNumberofFollowing and tNumberofStatusesCount. 
 
We observed that the more features added to the classification framework, the less accurate 
our model becomes.  
 
 Measure  Value  Derivations  
Sensitivity  0.1124  TPR = TP / (TP + FN)  
Specificity  0.8808 SPC = TN / (FP + TN)  
Precision  0.5282  PPV = TP / (TP + FP)  
Negative Predictive 
Value  
0.4552  NPV = TN / (TN + FN)  
False Positive Rate  0.1192 FPR = FP / (FP + TN)  
False Discovery Rate  0.4718  FDR = FP / (FP + TP)  
False Negative Rate  0.8876  FNR = FN / (FN + TP)  
Accuracy  0.4636 ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)  
F1 Score  0.1853  F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)  
Matthews Correlation 
Coefficient  
-0.0107  TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP) 




4.3 Experiment III 
Poor results obtained from the social honeypot experiment led us to creating a final testing 
dataset. To understand why the social honeypot dataset performed poorly when it comes 
to detecting human accounts, we performed a cross-dataset analysis by using uploaded bot 
dataset on Bot Repository to create a new labeled dataset. We merged the Self-identified 
bots (botwiki-verified) dataset and Celebrity account collected as authentic users 
(celebrity) dataset to create a new testing dataset.  One way to analyze different training 
dataset is to look at the datasets in feature space (Yang et al., 2020).  
Visualizing the two datasets together was difficult as there were too many data points so 
instead we sampled 500 out of 699 verified bots from the botwiki dataset and 500 out of 
20,984 verified human accounts from the celebrity dataset to create a balanced dataset.  To 
achieve consistency, we supplied the social honeypot dataset as a training set to test the 
merged dataset. Using random forest classifier, the social honeypot dataset achieved a 
58.9% precision and 65% accuracy (see Table 4.3.1) and this level of performance shows 
that no dataset can generalize well on all other datasets (Yang et al., 2020).  
We observed few factors that contributed to the poor results from the social honeypot 
experiment. First, the datasets used had inconsistent classes. The social honeypot dataset 
had few features as compared to the botwiki and celebrity dataset. The few features that 
the social honeypot dataset has can only capture a tiny sector of a user account’s 
characteristics. Third, the datasets used were annotated by different people with different 






Results   True Positive   True Negative   
Predicted Positive   500 (TP)  350 (FP)  
Predicted Negative   0 (FN)  150(TN)  
 
Measure  Value  Derivations  
Sensitivity  1.0000  TPR = TP / (TP + FN)  
Specificity  0.3000  SPC = TN / (FP + TN)  
Precision  0.5882  PPV = TP / (TP + FP)  
Negative Predictive Value  1.0000  NPV = TN / (TN + FN)  
False Positive Rate  0.7000  FPR = FP / (FP + TN)  
False Discovery Rate  0.4118  FDR = FP / (FP + TP)  
False Negative Rate  0.0000 FNR = FN / (FN + TP)  
Accuracy  0.6500 ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N)  
F1 Score  0.7407 F1 = 2TP / (2TP + FP + FN)  
Matthews Correlation 
Coefficient  
0.4201  TP*TN - FP*FN / sqrt((TP+FP) 
*(TP+FN) *(TN+FP) *(TN+FN))  
Table 4.3.1: Confusion matrix for the results of our second testing dataset. Metrics used were: 
tLengthofName, tLengthofScreenName, tNumberofListedCount, tNumberoffavorite, 





To contrast results with RTbust data to detect bots the social honeypot dataset was used to 
classify the unlabeled COVID-19 data. We classified our COVID-19 dataset with the 
classification framework from the social honeypot dataset to see how many bots the 
classification algorithm detects in our COVID-19 dataset. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.1: Covid-19 Trend analysis generated by using the social honeypot dataset as a training set. The 
metrics used were userID, screen_namelength, description_length following_count, friend_count, 
statuses_count.  
Figure 4.3.1 shows that out of 39,091 tweets sampled from February to April, the model 
we built using the social honeypot dataset classified 36,949 user accounts as bots and 2,142 
user accounts as humans. We also generated a trend analysis Trend analysis by using 
RTbust: Exploiting temporal patterns for botnet detection on twitter dataset to see how the 
model we built classifies the COVID-19 dataset. Results are inverted compared to the 
results obtained with the social honeypot data.  Classifying the COVID-19 data with the 
social honeypot shows more content was created by bots compared to humans while the 
RTbust data suggests more human content was created compared to bots.  This highlights 




with RTbust from experiments I and II, it is our conjecture that RTbust provides a more 
accurate representation of bot generated content. 
 
Figure 4.3.2: COVID-19 Trend analysis generated by the RTbust training set. The metrics used were userID, 
namelength, screen_namelength, listed count, and favorites count. 
We started by using the user account features (i.e., listed count, favorite count, length of 
name, length of screen name and statuses count) that generated the highest precision and 
accuracy (i.e., 92% and 95% respectively) from the training and testing dataset experiment. 
Figure 4.3.2 shows that out of 39,091 tweets from February to April, the model we built 
using the RTbust dataset detected 5,867 user accounts as bots as compared to 36,949 bots 
detected by the model that we built using the social honeypot dataset. The RTbust 
classification model also detected 33,224 accounts humans as compared to 2,142 detected 
human accounts by the social honeypot classification framework 
Based on the results in Table 4.3.2, it can be observed that there was a 43% increase in bot 
generated content with the RTbust data compared to only a 39% increase in bot generated 
content based on the social honeypot data.  Even though the social honeypot data shows a  
February March April
Bot 1295 1918 2654





















Month # bots 
Social Honeypot 
(ACU < 0.5) 
# bots 
RTbust 
(ACU > 0.94) 
February  8553 1295 
March 11946 1918 
April  16450 2654 
Average % increase (Feb-April) 39% 43% 
 
Table 4.3.2: Shows the monthly classification of bots from the model we built using our training datasets. 
greater number of bots each month compared to humans the percentage increase is actually 
lower.  Also, we know that the social honeypot is not accurate but even still we can show 
that the average increase in number of bots is greater.   
The model we built using social honeypot dataset (ACU < 0.5) misclassified most user 
accounts as bots while the RTbust model generated the results that we expected to see with 
an accuracy at 95%. We observed that between February and March, the number of bots 
detected increased by 32.4% from 1,295 to 1,918 and by 27.8% between the month of 
March to April. Figure 4.3.2 also shows an upward trend of legitimate users that were 
tweeting about the Coronavirus pandemic. A likely cause for this upward trend in human 
generated content could be due to several factors such as, high unemployment rates across 
all states, lockdowns and school shut downs. Twitter for example, has gained 14 million 
additional users from the end of 2019 to the start of 2020 which is 24% higher than from 




We also observed a greater percentage increase in the number of bots detected with RTbust 
training set (43%) as compared to Social Honeypot training set (39%) even though the 
social honeypot shows a greater number of bots detected each month compared to humans, 
the percentage increase is actually lower.  Also, we know that the social honeypot is not 
accurate but even still we can show that the average increase in the number of bots is 
greater. 
4.4 Misinformation and Topic Analysis 
We performed an independent data analysis by randomly selecting 7000 detected tweets 
for bots and 14,000 detected tweets for humans to see the sort of information or 
misinformation that was been disseminated between January and April. Table 4.4.1 shows 
the number of detected bots and humans that we randomly selected for topic analysis and 
misinformation from our COVID-19 dataset. 
Topic Analysis Misinformation Analysis 
Humans (N=1000) Humans (N=14,000) 
Bots (N=1000) Bots (N=7000) 
 
Table 4.4.1: shows the sample size for topic analysis and misinformation analysis 
4.4.1 Bots 
Bots were identified using the optimal features discussed in section 3 of this paper. Using 
Bot Sentinel, we matched some of the most used hashtags from the user ids like 




and #DarkToLight. Bot Sentinel is a free platform created to spot and track trollbots and 
malicious and untrustworthy Twitter accounts. Bot sentinel makes use of machine learning 
and artificial intelligence to observe Twitter accounts and classify those accounts being 
studied as social bots or not. Bot Sentinel stores these detected accounts in a database so 
that developers can extract these accounts for further studies. Bot Sentinel also acts a 
disinformation and misinformation tool by tracking, identifying and tagging malicious 
accounts that may be spreading false information (Bot Sentinel , 2019). 
 
Figure 4.4.1:Shows the most used hashtags by bots in our COVID-19 dataset from February 2020 – April 
2020. 
Figure 4.4.2 shows that out of the 1000 bots we selected, 56% of the bots that were detected 
by our classification model were engaged in some form of conspiracies and political 
propaganda when we looked at some of the tweets that were posted. 14% were engaged in 
the discussion of the American public health. About 10% of the bots detected were engaged 



















spread of other misinformation like “COVID is a hoax”, “bleach is a COVID cure”, 
“wearing a mask increases your chances of getting COVID” etc. Online fact checking tools 
like Poynter (http://www.poynter.com) and Bot Sentinel (Bot Sentinel, 2019) were used to 
detect misinformation generated by bots.  The spread of conspiracies on online social 
media platforms is a well-established issue (E. Ferrara, 2020).  It is worth noting that the 
actual number of coronavirus related bot tweets are probably higher, as Bot Sentinel only 
identifies hashtag terms (such as #Trump2020) and ignores “Trump2020” or “COVID-19”. 
 We also matched 1000 detected human tweets to see what sort of information or 
misinformation that was been disseminated. COVID-19 has had a significant impact on the 
quality of life in the US and around the world. During the months from February 2020 thru 
April 2020 (period for our dataset), there were more than 60,000 deaths in the US, 
unemployment level at 40 million, lockdowns and state of emergencies in all 50 states. 
Consequently, as the pandemic became more widespread more online information was 
being generated.  Based on the analysis it can also be observed that there was an upward 
trend of misinformation from the month of February to April in Figure 4.4.3.   
To estimate the amount of misinformation during the months of February through April of 
2020, tweets generated by humans is also analyzed. 
4.4.2 Humans 
Figure 4.4.3 shows that about 25% of detected human tweets were engaged in the 
discussion of general health and self-care issues (#CoronavirusIsTheTruth, 
#TheGreatAwakening, #MAGA, #WWG1WGA, #quarantineandchill, #toiletpapercrisis, 




health, about 17% were engaged in the spread of conspiracies and political propaganda, 
15% were engaged in WHO, Wuhan, vaccine  and Trump issues, 11% were engaged in 5G 
and Covid-19 conspiracies, and the rest of the human tweets detected were engaged in the 
discussion of variety of topics (#others).  
  
Figure 4.4 2:Shows the most used hashtags by bots in our Covid-19 dataset. 
Figure 4.4.3 also shows that humans were engaged in a wide variety of topics as compared 
to bots. One notable distinction between bots and human tweets from Figures 4.4.2 and 
Figure 4.4.3 is that bots tend to be more narrowly focused on a small number of hashtags 



























#Coronavirus (H) #Covid-19 (H) #Trump2020 #5G
#CoronavirusIsTheTruth #TheGreatAwakening #MAGA #WWG1WGA





This suggests bots may apply a more targeted or localized approach for spreading 
misinformation.  In contrast the topic distribution for human tweets during the 3-month 
period analyzed consists of greater diversity of topics.  The difference in topic distribution 
could be due the imbalance of data used for the analysis.  Fewer tweets were analyzed for 
bots compared to humans.  To address this issue, our data was normalized in the following 
analysis to more accurately measure the differences observed in topic distributions (see 
Figure 4.4.2.1). 
Bot Sentinel (Bot Sentinel, 2019) and Poynter (http://www.poynter.com) were used to 
check for disinformation and misinformation that were disseminated by humans and bots 
on Twitter between February and April. 14,000 tweets for humans and 7,000 tweets for 
bots were randomly sampled from February 1, 2020 to April 30, 2020. A total of 21,000 
tweets were used for misinformation analysis. We observed that #Coronavirus, and 
#Covid-19 are the most used hashtags with the most misinformation. The #other category 
is made up of other hashtags that were infrequently used by humans such as #Wuhan, 




Figure 4.4.3: Misinformation by humans over time (1000 tweets) 
 
4.4.2.1 Reasons for misinformation disseminated by humans 
Possible reasons for misinformation disseminated by humans are grouped into four 
categories which have been explained below: 
1. Ignorance  
Ignorance was one crucial reason for the dissemination of wrong information in Twitter 
between Feb 1st to Feb 12th, 2020. We observed that at that time Twitter users did not really 
understand the nature of the pandemic, how the pandemic came about, how the 
Coronavirus spreads, and what to do and what not to do. We observed a lot of 
disinformation as compared misinformation between the first two weeks of February. 
Wrong information ranged from the spread of conspiracies like “the virus is a man-made 
weapon”, “Lysol can cure Coronavirus”, “the use of rubbing alcohol is enough to prevent 

























that had died from the virus or have been infected by the virus beginning February. For 
example, we observed claims that more than 100,000 people have died from the virus 
between February 1, 2020 to February 12, 2020. To solve the issue of disinformation and 
misinformation, the WHO launched a pilot program (EPI-WIN) in early January that 
extended to February to make sure that correct information are disseminated on various 
social media platforms. This action by the WHO was laudable but did little to bring down 
the issue of disinformation at that time. We observed that false information was retweeted 
later on in the month of February.   
2. Retweeting of Bot Tweets  
About 30% of the misinformation or disinformation that we detected through Bot Sentinel 
and Poynter came from retweets of Bot contents by humans. We observed that there were 
political agendas behind these fake coronavirus tweets by Bot that were retweeted by 
humans.  For example, we observed that some Twitter users that oppose certain decisions 
made by China tend to retweet anything that is politically against China to create 
misunderstandings and make the people believe less in the Chinese authorities. Some of 
the retweets that we observed were tweets that targeted the American health system and 
leaders who are trying to manage the spread of the Coronavirus. We think that the purpose 
of these tweets was to undermine, destroy or disrupt the American health system. 
3. Illiteracy 
Illiteracy was also one of the main reasons that led to the spread of misinformation and 
disinformation among humans.in Twitter. For example, the WHO through its EPI – WIN 
project had to exposed the falseness or hollowness of the belief that sesame oil and 




did not clearly understand most of the messages that were relayed by Dr. Fauci and the 
American Health System and this reflected in the tweets that the posted on their Twitter 
homepages.  
4. Conspiracies and political propaganda 
Conspiracy theories and false information about Coronavirus became a problem, as the 
pandemic spread across the globe. We detected a lot of tweets from February to April that 
were making it cumbersome for online social media users to spot trustworthy sources of 
information as these tweets were spreading conspiracies and political propaganda. The 
growing number of people getting infected and the enforcement of social distancing 
protocols led to widespread online discourse about the pandemic on various social media 
outlets with an increasing number of conspiracies and misinformation (Sharma et al., 
2020).  For example, Figure 4.4.5 shows some of the tweets that has been flagged as 
spreading conspiracies from the tweets that we analyzed.  
            
                




4.4.2.2 Reasons for misinformation disseminated by humans 
 
Figure 4.4.5: Shows Bot Misinformation and Disinformation Trend Analysis (N=500) 
Figure 4.4.6 shows the most used hashtags and the amount of disinformation that was 
disseminated by bots from February 1st, 2020 to April 26th, 2020. At the time of this 
writing (March 2021), most of the bots especially QAnon and Pro Trump bots detected by 
our classification framework had already been taken down by Twitter so we relied mostly 
on the dataset content that we hydrated using Twitter’s API to check for false information 
by using Poynter’s FactChat. We observed a gradual rise in the level of misinformation 
disseminated by Bots in Twitter. We categorize the entities responsible for the spread of 
misinformation bots below: 
1. Pro Trump Bots  
We analyzed the bots detected by our classification framework and observed that in the 
month of March, when the pandemic was becoming an issue in the United States and all 





















conspiracies, and indorse the conspiracy theory that the Coronavirus was a virus or a 
bioweapon created by China to destroy the United States. While analyzing tweet contents, 
we found a lot of Pro Trump bot accounts that retweeted Covid-19 related issues in a 
synchronized manner. We observed that, there were tweets from Pro Trump bots kept 
posting virus conspiracy theories over a period of time. These tweets were retweeted, liked 
many times by some Twitter users and had lots of impressions. At the time of this writing, 
Twitter had already suspended over 5000 Pro Trump bot accounts and others that were 
associated with it for amplifying certain political messages and spreading false 
information. (Hunt, 2019). The outcome of this Pro Trump was the augmentation of 
misinformation or disinformation by hardcore Trump supporters. 
2. QAnon Bots  
QAnon is a far right- wing, loosely organized association of supporters who accept a range 
of unproven beliefs. The Storm and the Great Awakening are two major things that QAnon 
followers are waiting for. The Storm has to do with the mass arrest of individuals in high 
official positions while the Great Awakening has to do with a single event that would show 
everyone that the QAnon beliefs were accurate the whole time (What Is QAnon? What We 
Know About the Conspiracy-Theory Group – WSJ, 2021). During the pandemic, QAnon 
followers added to their unproven belief that individuals that would take the Covid-19 
vaccine increases the likelihood of them being classified as either homosexual or 
transgender in the future.  While most of the QAnon bots that our classification framework 
detected were created by Researchers, we observed that most of the tweets by QAnon bots 
were liked and retweeted by bots and supporters of QAnon. We also observed Russian 




3. Republican Bots   
Republican bots are bots that were trying to deceive social media users in the United States 
and control the 2020 United States elections in favor of Donald Trump. While we did not 
find any connections between republican bots that our model detected and Russian 
operatives, (Chen et al., 2020) and (E. Ferrara, 2020) reported that these bots were created 
and operated by Russians. According to these authors, Russian operatives created these 
bots to make people support and vote for Donald Trump in the United States 2020 elections. 
4. Human-Like Bots  
In the past, Bots used to have simple tactics that were not difficult to spot but today, 
artificial intelligence (AI) tools that creates human-like language have made it cumbersome 
to detect certain malicious social media bots. This is due to the fact that, these human-like 
bots behave in the same way as humans which makes it difficult to tell what is real and 
what is not. Researchers have observed that these bots survive longer on social media 
platforms and can create a network of bots which are synchronized to act in a certain 
manner (E. Ferrara, 2020). Our detection model failed to detect any human- like bots but 
we were able to detect botnets that were working together to disseminate false information 
on Twitter using Bot Sentinel. Using Bot Sentinel, we examined user account features such 
as follower count, account age, tweet sentiment score, friend count etc. to tell if tweets 
from the account were coming from a human or a bot. 




5G Conspiracy theories picked up steam in 2020 when the Russian government’s news 
outlet issued a warning that 5G can kill (Evanega et al., 2020). The “5G can kill” warning 
was picked up by a French conspiracy website known as Les moutons enrages, which 
proposed a direct relation between Covid-19 and the installation of 5G towers in Wuhan, 
China. The unproven idea that there was a correlation between 5G and the novel 
Coronavirus started to spread on Twitter and broke into mainstream media coverage on 
April 5 with extensive reporting of destruction of 5G towers in the United Kingdom and 
other countries(Evanega et al., 2020). 5G conspiracy tweets was one of the common 
misinformation or disinformation tweets that we observed in our COVID-19 dataset. The 
fact-checking feedback we got from Poynter and Bot Sentinel shows how misinformed or 
disinformed individuals on Twitter have been during the early stages of the pandemic.  
 
4.4.2.3 Bot Vs Human Misinformation Analysis  
 
We focused on the most used hashtags for the detected bots and humans to see if bots have 
a higher likelihood to spread misinformation as compared to humans. Figure 4.9.2 shows 
that humans have a higher probability (0.24) to spread misinformation as compared to bots 
(0.20) from our Covid-19 dataset. We mentioned earlier that we observed that about 30% 
of tweets from detected humans that were spreading misinformation came from retweets 
of bot content so that explains why we are seeing a higher likelihood to spread 
misinformation by humans as compared to bots.  When we account for humans retweeting 
bot content, humans actually may not be spreading misinformation intentionally.  Figure 
4.4.7 shows that bots on Twitter indirectly spread misleading content through humans by 




We also observed that after March 7th, 2020, there was a big separation between the 
#Coronavirus and the # Covid-19 hashtags for humans. The big separation seen in Figure 
4.4.8 for humans has to do with Twitter’s effort to crackdown Coronavirus related 
misinformation between March and April. Twitter put in place policies aimed at 
suspending tweets in all hashtags categories from user accounts that were disseminating 
misinformation about the Coronavirus between March and April.   
 
 
Figure 4.4.6: Shows the mean probability to spread misinformation (Bots vs Humans) 
Since the #Coronavirus and #Covid-19 categories were the most used hashtags by bots and 





Figure 4.4.7: Shows the probability for misinformation (#Coronavirus, #Covid-19): bots vs humans. 
 
4.3 Sentiment Analysis (Bots vs. Humans) 
 
We analyze 100 tweets each for bots and humans detected in each of the #Coronovirus and 
#Covid-19 category for every two weeks from February to April from our Covid-19 dataset 
to see the sort of sentiments that were been expressed by the detected bots and humans As 
a result, we sampled a total of 3,200 tweets from February to April. Sentiments were 
extracted from the detected human and bot tweets to study their perception towards the 
coronavirus outbreak. We use (Hutto & Gilbert, 2014.) lexical sentiment extraction to 
generate the valence (positive or negative) of a Twitter user’s tweet.  We also relied on Bot 
Sentinel as an overall sentiment score generator to give every detected user account from 
the two most used hashtags by bots and humans (#Coronavirus and #Covid-19) a sentiment 




As discussed earlier, most of the prominent issues that were discussed on Twitter between 
February and April centered around prevention measures such as the usage of hand 
sanitizers and Lysol, frequent hand washing and the wearing of mask, travel restrictions, 
global outbreaks (Italy, China, Germany, Iran etc.), symptoms and infections, global death 
rates, government response etc. Figure 4.4.9 and Figure 4.4.10 shows the weekly average 
sentiment score for detected humans and bots from the Covid-19 dataset.  
From Figure 4.4.9 and Figure 4.4.10, we can see that the bots that our classification model 
detected were expressing more negative sentiments as compared to humans.  We also 
observed that after 7th March, 2020 the level of negative sentiments expressed on the 
pandemic dropped. As discussed earlier, the reason why we are seeing a dip in sentiments 
expressed on Twitter with regards to the pandemic in the month of March has to do with 
Twitter’s effort to crackdown misinformation when it comes to the pandemic.  
 
Figure 4.4.8: shows Human sentiment score on #Coronavirus and #Covid-19 (Left) and sample of tweets that 
show how tweets are rated (Right). 
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Figure 4.4.9: Shows Bot sentiment score on #Coronavirus #Covid-19 
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Figure 4.4 11: Shows the average sentiment (Bot vs Human) on #Covid-19 from February to March. 
 
We also analyze the overall sentiment of a user’s account by evaluating his or her account 
on Bot Sentinel for a general score. We use Bot Sentinel to rate the detected user accounts 
in the #Coronavirus and #Covid-19 category with a score from 0-100. The higher the score, 
the higher the likelihood that the account engages in the spread of false information and 
other malicious activities such as harassment, trolling etc. Bot Sentinel analysis several 
tweets per a Twitter account and the more a Twitter user engages in an act that is consistent 
with disruptive or problematic accounts, the higher their Bot Sentinel score is. A total of 
900 unique user accounts (450 detected bots and 450 detected human accounts) from 
February to April were evaluated on Bot Sentinel for a general score. Figure 4.4.13 shows 
how Bot  entinel rates a user’s account based on his or her overall sentiments or tweets 
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The purpose of rating and scoring the 900 unique Twitter accounts is to observe how many 
detected bots and humans fall into the Normal, Satisfactory Disruptive and Problematic 
categories on Bot Sentinel. Figure 4.4.14 shows that 189 out of the 450 bot accounts 
detected by our classification framework were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive 
behaviors. 89 and 158 detected bots exhibited Normal and Satisfactory Tweeting activities. 
14 detected bot accounts produced no results which means that those accounts have been 
suspended temporarily or permanently by Twitter.  
 
 
                       Figure 4.4.12: Shows examples of  how Bot Sentinel rates a Twitter user Account. 
The results obtained from Bot Sentinel shows how difficult it is to tell if an account belongs 




Today, we have bots exhibiting human behaviors and normal tweeting activities on social 
media platforms so the results obtained from Bot Sentinel is not surprising. Figure 4.4.14 
also shows that out of the 450 selected human accounts that were evaluated on Bot Sentinel, 
195 and 175 accounts exhibited Normal and Satisfactory tweeting activities. 63 out of the 
450 human accounts were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive behaviors on Twitter. 
17 detected human accounts were suspended temporarily or permanently which means that 
there were more suspended human accounts as compared to bots. Bot Sentinel does not 
show the specific reasons why those human and bot accounts were suspended. We believe 
that those accounts were suspended due to violations of Twitter policies. None of the 
accounts we evaluated on Bot Sentinel fell into the Problematic category. 
 
Figure 4.4.13: Shows Bot Sentinel rating and score for 900 unique Twitter accounts. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECCOMENDATION  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
We present the summary of major outcomes in chapter three and four in this chapter.  Our 
conclusions and recommendations which we draw from the outcomes of the research are examined 
with respect to the objectives of the study which was to use a hybrid approach that incorporates 
user account features, topic analysis and sentiment analysis to detect bots on a large-scale Twitter 
dataset. We report the summary of key findings of this paper in Section 5.2. The concluding 
remarks and recommendations of the research outcomes have been presented in Section 5.3 and 
5.4 respectively. 
 
5.2 Summary of Major Findings  
 
We proposed a hybrid approach that integrates Twitter user account features, topic analysis 
and sentiment analysis to detect malicious social bots. To achieve the objective of the 
study, we used the newly developed Twitter COVID-19 endpoint to access COVID-19 and 
coronavirus-related tweets across languages that provided a dataset of millions of tweets 
between February 1st, 2020 to April 30th 2020.  
The Twitter’s search API was used to hydrate tweets from multiple countries in various 
languages that contained any word associated with COVID-19 (i.e., ncov19, covid, covid-
19, coronavirus, ncov2019) that were used in (Lopez et al., 2020). We sampled a total of 
39,084 tweets out of 71,908 tweets across the three-month period that this paper focused 




(Morstatter et al., 2016; Dickerson et al., 2014 Ferrara et al., 2016). As a result, we tested 
eight (10) highly predictive user account features which captures several suspicious 
behaviors to enable us to detect malicious social media bots. We relied on Bot Repository 
to create a training and testing dataset of already labelled dataset for our experiment.   For 
our training dataset, we used the Social Honeypot Dataset as our first training dataset and 
the RTbust: Exploiting Temporal Patterns for Botnet Detection on Twitter as our second 
training dataset.  
Using Weka machine learning tool, we followed the same classification framework used 
by the authors in (Lee, Eoff, and Caverlee, 2011) to see what the dataset’s prediction 
accuracy is. In the first experiment, we tested 20 classification algorithms, such as, random 
forest, naive Bayes, logistic regression and tree-based algorithm, all with default values for 
all parameters using 10-fold cross validation. We found the results from Weka consistent, 
with a prediction accuracy ranging from 99% to 91% across most classifiers (15 out 20 
tested) for our first training dataset. For the other 5 out of 20 tested, accuracy ranged 
between 90% to as low as 89%. We created our second training dataset by using 254 human 
accounts and 144 bot accounts from the RTbust: Exploiting Temporal Patterns for Botnet 
Detection on Twitter Dataset. We tested for prediction accuracy by using Random classifier 
and observed a 100% prediction accuracy.  
In the second experiment, we used the fame for sale: Efficient Detection of fake Twitter 
followers on twitter as a testing dataset in this paper. To create our legitimate user dataset 
from the fame for sale dataset, we sampled 235 out of 574 human accounts from 




dataset.  We created our bot dataset by selecting all fake followers from the “intertwitter” 
(INT) dataset. 
We observed that the social honeypot dataset correctly classified all accounts that were 
verified as bots in the Fame for sale: efficient detection of fake Twitter follower’s dataset 
but misclassified 1284 human accounts as bots. The social honeypot dataset could detect 
only 196 out of a total of 1199 verified human accounts as humans. Our second baseline 
dataset was also used as a training set for Fame for sale: efficient detection of fake Twitter 
follower dataset to see if the results are better than what the Social Honeypot dataset 
produced.  With precision and accuracy at 92% and 95% respectively, the results from our 
second experiment with the same features used in the social honeypot dataset were better 
than the results produced by the Social Honeypot training set. We observed that our 
category 1 features (favorite count, listed count, name length, and number of tweets) 
performed better than those found in category 2 (follower count, following count, length 
of screen name and description length). In general, there was a 1% to 2% prediction 
accuracy increase across most Tree-based classifiers that were used. However, we observed 
that prediction accuracy of the RTbust classification framework dropped as we added 
social honeypot features (see section 4).   
In our third experiment, we created a final testing dataset due to poor results obtained from 
our first testing dataset experiment. Using random forest classifier, the social honeypot 
dataset achieved a 58.9% precision and 65% accuracy. We observed few factors that 
contributed to the poor results from the social honeypot experiment. First, the datasets used 
had inconsistent classes. The social honeypot dataset had few features as compared to the 




can only capture a tiny sector of a user account’s characteristics. Lastly, the datasets used 
were annotated by different people with different standards using variety of methods. 
We classified our COVID-19 dataset by using the features that generated the highest 
precision and accuracy (i.e., 92% and 95% respectively) from the training and testing 
dataset experiment. Our classification framework shows that out of 39,091 tweets sampled, 
the model we built using the RTbust dataset classified 5,867 user accounts as bots as 
compared to 36,949 bots detected by the classification model built using the social 
honeypot dataset. 
To do a topic and trend analysis between bots and humans, we used Bot Sentinel to match 
some of the hashtags from our Covid-19 tweet dataset like #coronavirus, #Covid-19, 
#Trump2020, #MAGA, #WWG1WGA, #TheGreatAwakening, and #DarkToLight etc. We 
observed that humans have a wide variety of topics expressed on Twitter as compared to 
bots. We also observed that the sort of information disseminated by bots are much more 
targeted as compared to humans. The most used hashtags for bots and humans from our 
topic analysis were #Coronavirus and #Covid-19. 
User # of tweets for all hashtags Fraction of Misinformation (human vs Bot) for all #hashtags 
Human 14,000 4,497 
Bot 7,000 1,949 
Total 21,000 6,446 
Table 5.2 1 Total number of detected human tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid-
19 only). 
The dataset in Table 5.2.1 used for misinformation analysis contains twice as many tweets 
posted by humans compared to bots.  We used Bot Sentinel, Poynter and other fact 




human posts were classified as misinformation, while 30% of posts created by bots were 
classified as misinformation. 
Initial analysis suggested bots spread less misinformation compared to humans however, 
it was observed that that about 30% of tweets from detected humans that were spreading 
misinformation came from retweets of bot content.  This result validates prior research 
suggesting humans frequently re-tweet bot generated content (Shao, et al., 2018).  This 
may explain why we saw a higher likelihood to spread misinformation by humans as 
compared to bots.  When we account for humans retweeting bot content, humans actually 
may not be spreading misinformation intentionally. We observed that bots on Twitter 
indirectly spread misleading content through humans by leveraging some human’s inability 
to detect false information. We categorize the entities responsible for the spread of 
misinformation bots into: Pro Trump bots, QAnon bots, Republican bots, 5G conspiracies 
and Human-like bots. We also categorize possible reasons for misinformation disseminated 
by humans into: ignorance, illiteracy, retweeting of bot content and the spread of 
conspiracies and political propaganda.  We focused on the most used hashtags for the 
detected bots and humans to see if bots have a higher likelihood to spread misinformation 
as compared to humans.  
Moreover, we analyze 100 tweets each for bots and humans detected in each of the 
#Coronovirus and #Covid-19 category for every two weeks from February to April from 
our Covid-19 dataset to see the sort of sentiments that were been expressed by the detected 
bots and humans.  As a result, a total of 3,200 tweets were used for sentiment analysis. 





#Hashtag Human Bot #Hashtag Total 
#Coronavirus  800 tweets 800 tweets 1,600 
#Covid-19 800 tweets 800 tweets 1,600 
Total  1,600 tweets 1,600 tweets 3,200 
Table 5.2 2 Total number of tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid-19 only) 
 
#Hashtag #Coronavirus #Covid-19 #Hashtag Total 
February 200 200 400 
March 300 300 600 
April 300 300 600 
Monthly Total 800 800 1,600 
Table 5.2 3 Total number of detected human tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid-
19 only). 
#Hashtag #Coronavirus #Covid-19 #Hashtag Total 
February 200 200 400 
March 300 300 600 
April 300 300 600 
Monthly Total 800 800 1,600 
Table 5.2 4 Total number of detected bots tweets used for sentiment analysis (#Coronavirus and #Covid-19 
only). 
It was observed that the bots that our classification model detected were expressing more 
negative sentiments as compared to humans. We also we analyzed the overall sentiment 
score of a Twitter user’s account by evaluating his or her account on Bot Sentinel. We 
evaluated 900 unique Twitter accounts (450 each for bots and humans) in our Covid-19 
dataset and observed that 189 out of the 450 bot accounts detected by our classification 
framework were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive behaviors. 89 bot accounts were 




Tweeting activities on Bot Sentinel. 14 detected bot accounts produced no results which 
means that those accounts have been suspended temporarily or permanently by Twitter. 
For humans, out of the 450 selected human accounts that were evaluated on Bot Sentinel, 
195 detected human accounts exhibited Normal tweeting activities, 175 detected human 
account were flagged as accounts exhibiting satisfactory tweeting activities. 63 out of the 
450 human accounts were flagged as accounts exhibiting disruptive behaviors on Twitter. 
17 detected human accounts were suspended temporarily or permanently which means that 
there were more suspended human accounts as compared to bots. The sentiment results 
obtained from Bot Sentinel are provided in Table 5.2.5 and Table 5.2.6. 
Hashtag Negative Sentiment Positive Sentiment N 
#Coronavirus 27.6% 72.4% 800 
#Covid-19 28.9% 72.4% 800 
Table 5.2 5 Fraction of negative and positive sentiment generated by humans on #Coronavirus and #Covid-
19 from February to April 
 
Hashtag Negative Sentiment Positive Sentiment N 
#Coronavirus 83.0% 29.5% 800 
#Covid-19 83.6% 21.0% 800 
Table 5.2 6 Fraction of negative and positive sentiment generated by bots on #Coronavirus and #Covid-19 
from February to April  
Comparing the results from both tables 5.2.4 and 5.2.5 it can be observed that bots 
generated more posts of negative sentiment compared to humans and humans created more 
posts with positive sentiment compared to bots.  This result aligns with previous research 
that suggest bot strategies are often focused on increasing human exposure to negative and 





Today, we have bots exhibiting human behaviors and normal tweeting activities on social 
media platforms and identifying features and methods to detect them is becoming 
increasingly important.  Results from this research provide insight into features and 
algorithms that can help detect bots.  Specifically, we found the random forest algorithm 
provides the highest accuracy with twitter features such as favorite count and listed count 
compared to results obtained in prior research.  In addition, sentiment and topic 
distributions are other key factors that may help to discriminate between bot and human 
social media behavior.  Bots typically align with fewer topics compared to humans which 
suggest bots have a narrower and targeted approach.  Also, bots tend to create more 
negative sentiment posts compared to human posts.  A summary of the hypotheses and 
results for this research are summarized in Table 5.2.7. 
Hypothesis Description Result 
H1 The spread of misinformation or disinformation by 
bots regarding content related to COVID-19 will be 
higher than the spread of misinformation or 
disinformation by humans. 
Supported:  Results from 
Experiment III (section 4) 
indicate bots spread more 
disinformation compared to 
humans 
H2 The accuracy to detect misinformation by bots will be 
higher using twitter features such as favorite count, 
and listed count, as compared to social honeypot 
features. 
Supported: Results from 
Experiment I shows that, favorite 
count and listed count improves 
the accuracy to detect 
mis/disinformation as compared 
to social honeypot features 
(section 5.2). 
H3 The distribution of different topics will be greater for 
humans compared to bots. We expect humans to have 
a wider variety of topics expressed in Twitter as 
compared to bots.  
 
Supported: Results from section 
4 shows that the topic distribution 
for human tweets during the 3-
month period analyzed consists 
of greater diversity of topics. 
H4 Detected bots will express more negative sentiments 
on Covid-19 related issues as compared to humans.  
 
Supported: Results from section 
4 shows that detected bots 
expressed more negative 
sentiments as compared to 
humans on Covid-19 related 
issues. 





5.3 Concluding Remarks  
 
This research explores social media bots, Botnets, detection of malicious bots, the motive 
and entities behind the spread of misinformation by malicious bots during the Coronavirus 
(COVID-19) pandemic era between February 1st, 2020 and April 30th, 2020. Using a hybrid 
approach that incorporates Twitter user account features, topic analysis and sentiment 
features to detect bots on a large-scale Twitter dataset, we were able to detect malicious 
social media bots.  
Our findings show that there were automated accounts that were used in a malicious 
manner to spread misinformation and unhealthy propaganda campaigns about the COVID-
19 pandemic.  
5.4 Recommendations  
 
As of the time of writing this paper (mid-March, 2020), there was not enough studies that 
researched into social media kinetics in the context of COVID-19. Today, a lot of studies 
have observed the spread of misinformation and questionable content that relates to 
COVID-19 pandemic, (Lopez et al., 2020 ; Chen et al., 2020;  E. Ferrara, 2020; Evanega 
et al., 2020 etc). Most of these studies have provided an incomplete outlook of online 
discussion and problems revolving around COVID-19, (Chen et al., 2020). There is a need 
for more research, as the landscape of information keeps evolving and more scientific 
knowledge are unveiled on how the spread of misinformation corrupts the online eco 
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